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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Why is Turkey a Member of the G20?
As all G20 members, Turkey was a member right from the start in 1999. ! en, in 
terms of share of world GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP), it already ranked 
16 in the world[1], as it still does today. As to population, with its almost 60 million 
people at that time, Turkey ranked 19th (in 2009 18th, with 70.5 million people), 
but came after a series of G20 and non-G20 members, such as Philippines and 
Ethiopia, and predominantly Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Egypt and Iran.[2] So, both in terms of economy and population Turkey 
was in the top 20. 
However, the founders of the G20 — Canadian # nance minister Paul Martin and 
his US counterpart Lawrence Summers — did not simply take the list of the 20 
largest populations or economies to compose the G20. ! ey were more interested in 
having a representative body, which comprised both the world’s biggest economies 
(such as the US, China and Japan), together with the relevant regional powers. ! is 
way, some top 20 economies — such as Spain and Netherlands — were not invited, 
since their region was already well represented, unlike non-top 20 economies such 
as South Africa and Saudi Arabia. 
In this sense, besides being one of the 20 largest economies of the world, Turkey 
was a logical choice because of other interesting assets. First, Turkey was and is an 
important regional power, with a great history, and precious ties to several other 
countries in the region and beyond. Second, it was one of the most important 
* Professor in Globalisation and Global Governance, Ghent University, Institute for International Studies, Ghent, 
Belgium.
** Assistant Professor, Vocational School of Social Sciences, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.
[1] In terms of GDP at current prices (USD) it was 21st, with a top 20 that also included Taiwan, for China an unacceptable 
G20 member. Now it is much ! rmer entrenched in the G20 based on that indicator (17th).
[2] Based on IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010.
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economies in the Muslim world. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, it was by far the largest in terms of GDP in current prices (USD), and 
the largest in terms of GDP at PPP, closely followed by G20 member Indonesia. 
Being a friend of the West — as a democracy, a member of NATO and OECD, 
and possibly a future EU member —, though, was not a decisive argument as such. 
! e G20 founders were not seeking full like-mindedness. ! ey wanted to build a 
forum to tackle political gridlocks on global issues. ! erefore, they also brought 
on board important players they had notable di$ erences with (such as China on 
global imbalances and India on trade).[1] Presumably, however, politics did play 
a role in excluding, for example, Iran, which was a relevant regional power too. 
In 1999, Iran had a larger population than Turkey, while it also belonged to the 
20 largest economies in terms of GDP by purchasing power parity. But of course, 
Iran was politically too isolated, and as such, not seen as an asset to the G20. In the 
case of Turkey, the combination of being quite compatible with the Western G20 
members, while nevertheless signi# cantly contributing to cultural, political and 
economic diversity within the group, made the country, in our view, all the more 
eligible. ! is way, Turkey could provide a “bridging function between Europe and 
Asia, as well as between the advanced industrial economies and emerging markets”[2]. 
In addition, Turkey was already known as an active and constructive player on the 
global # nancial scene for quite a long time. ! is had partly to do with in% uential 
individuals as well, who left a positive impression about Turkey and the quality of 
its o&  cials. A cited name in this context is for example Kemal Derviş, at the time 
of the creation of the G20 a senior World Bank o&  cial, and well-embedded in the 
international # nancial and economic policy establishment for years. In 2001-2002 
he was directly involved in the G20 as the minister representing Turkey, and in 
that capacity quite successful in tackling the Turkish # nancial crisis.[3] As a result, 
Turkish membership was a wholehearted wish of the founders, and never raised 
any controversy within the group. 
1.2. Internal Coordination of G20 matters
! e internal coordination of G20 matters within the Turkish state is more or less 
organized along the lines of the “G20 institutions” themselves, namely the leaders’ 
[1] Interview by telephone with the Right Honourable Paul MARTIN on 24 August 2010.
[2] Idem. 
[3] In 2001-2002 Mr. Derviş served as Minister for the Economy and the Treasury. Afterwards, he was elected as member 
of Parliament for the Republican People’s Party (CHP). In 2005, he became the head of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). See: http://www.undp.org/about/bio1.shtml.
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summit; the meeting of # nance ministers; the sherpa meetings; and the meetings 
of the deputy # nance ministers. ! e summits are attended by the Prime Minis-
ter, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and not by the President, Abdullah Gül. At the G20 
# nance ministerials, Turkey is represented by the Minister of the Economy[1], Ali 
Babacan. Unlike in other G20 countries, where the sherpa is with the o&  ce of the 
President, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, the Turkish sherpa, Ambassador 
Hakkı Akıl, is a high-ranking civil servant with the Ministry of Foreign A$ airs. 
Turkey’s “Deputy Finance Minister” (which is a G20, not a Turkish term) is also 
a top civil servant, namely Ibrahim Çanakci. His function in Ankara is “Under-
Secretary of the Treasury”, which is the head of the Treasury.[2]
In Turkey, as in other G20 countries, there is a de facto division of labor between 
the sherpa and deputy # nance minister. ! e sherpa has a role as the representative 
of the leader. In that capacity, he deals with the political coordination of the G20 
agenda. ! is also includes the broader G20 agenda with issues such as development, 
energy, climate, etc., as well as the wide range of topics (even matters without any 
relation to the o&  cial G20 agenda) leaders can raise at the plenary meeting of the 
summit, or at formal and informal bilateral meetings during the summit. ! e G20 
# nancial and economic agenda, at its general and technical level, is almost entirely 
coordinated by the Under-Secretary of the Treasury.[3] ! e Treasury is a branch of 
government that is supervised by Minister Babacan, having the following mission:[4] 
To manage public # nancial assets and liabilities, to regulate, implement and 
supervise economic, # nancial and sectoral policies, and to ensure the coordi-
nation of international economic relations in cooperation with all economic 
actors in a transparent, accountable and e&  cient way in order to contribute 
to the development of our country.
As such it is an important strategic body, both for domestic economic policy 
making, and for Turkish external # nancial and economic relations (including its 
membership in the IMF and World Bank). 
[1] O#  cally: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State.
[2] In Turkish: Hazine Müsteşarliği. 
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1.3. An Active, Self-Con" dent Middle Power
Turkey can be regarded as a “middle power”[1], comparable to other G20 members 
such as Australia, Mexico, Indonesia and South Korea. A middle power can be 
de# ned as “a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone e$ ectively, but 
may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international 
institution.”[2] In fact, they are “those states which are clearly not great powers but 
are not minor powers either.”[3] Literature on middle powers in the post-World 
War II era shows a broad diversity in middle power behavior, but also striking com-
monalities. In a majority of cases, middle powers cherish multilateral institutions 
and a rules-based international system; select certain “niches” to concentrate their 
foreign policies upon; engage in mediating between con% icting parties; and try to 
contribute to regional and/or global public goods. ! ey do so because they have a 
clear interest in reigning in the unilateralism and club behavior of the great powers. 
! erefore they promote an orderly international society in which their and others’ 
rights are guaranteed, and their objectives can be ful# lled. Notwithstanding their 
commitment to international public goods, middle powers continue to be self-
interested, with observable links between their foreign and multilateral engagement 
and domestic interests. Preconditions to such internationally engaged behavior are 
resources, a skilled and creative diplomacy, and above all, the will and ambition to 
play an active and visible international role — based on the self-identi# cation as a 
responsible power. ! e end of the Cold War added a new, interesting dimension to 
the phenomenon of middle powers, in particular by granting most of them much 
more diplomatic freedom.[4] 
Turkey is typically a middle power that shares several of the above-mentioned traits. 
According to Cooper’s typology to map the diversity among middle powers, one 
could say that Turkey is currently characterized by 1) a di$ use approach instead 
of targeting a few concrete niches, 2) an occasionally “heroic” style, 3) a basically 
regional focus, albeit with a growing global scope, and 4) a mix of an accommoda-
tive and combative attitude. 
[1] MÜFTÜLER, M., YÜKSEL, M., Turkey: A Middle Power in the New Order, in COOPER, A.F. (ed.), Niche Diplomacy. Middle Powers 
after the Cold War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 1997); KIRTON, J., Potential Partnership in Global Economic 
Governance: Canada’s G20 Summit from Toronto to Turkey. Paper prepared for a presentation at TEPAV, Ankara, and DEIK, 
Istanbul, Turkey, June 7-8, 2010. Version of June 13, 2010. 
[2] KEOHANE, R.O., Lilliputians’ Dilemma’s: Small States in International Politics, International Organization, 23, 1969, 2, 
cited in COOPER, A.F., Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview, in COOPER, A.F. (ed.), op. cit., 1997, p. 8. 
[3] COOPER, op. cit., 1997, p. 14.
[4] For an overview, see idem.
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Turkey’s current diplomacy is sometimes referred to as “hyperactive”[1], as it is inten-
sively working on various fronts at the same time. As there is not a small selection of 
targets or “niches”, its policy can be termed “di$ use.” ! is policy is relatively new. 
During most of the Cold War, Ankara’s foreign policy could be labeled as rather 
passive and sometimes even isolationist. ! e country was # rmly entrenched within 
the Western camp, while even experiencing relative isolation in the 1970s due to its 
position on Cyprus. ! e foreign policy was also determined, not to say stalled, by 
mutual suspicion between Turkey and its neighbors. Due to the end of Cold War 
and the advent of visionary leaders such as Prime Minister (1983-1989) and then 
President (1989-1993) Turgut Özal, Turkey eventually changed its international 
course. In fact, there was little alternative, as the major international developments 
at that time — the opening of the Soviet Union, uncertainty about the future of 
NATO, the intensi# cation of Kurdish separatism, the 1991 Gulf War, civil wars 
in the Caucasus and Balkans — generated both enormous opportunities and chal-
lenges for Turkey. ! e new policy was characterized by diplomatic and economic 
openness, a greater awareness of possible Turkish interests abroad, a strengthened 
commitment to integration with Europe, and the development of new international 
ties, notably with a series of newly “Turkic” independent republics of the former 
Soviet Union and Arab countries.[2] ! is, and the e$ orts of successive governments, 
laid the groundwork on which the AKP government, which came into power in 
2002, further built. 
! e present Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu — already a key foreign policy 
advisor before taking o&  ce in 2009 — is generally seen as the architect of what is 
now referred to as Turkey’s “360 degrees foreign policy.”[3] ! is means that Turkey 
on principle is willing to establish good relations with almost everybody else. A 
central component of this new policy is improving relations with the immediate 
neighborhood, better known as the “zero problems with neighbors policy.”[4] Over 
the last years, Ankara has actively invested in better relations with Greece, Armenia, 
Iran, Syria, and the Kurdish authority in Iraq. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
have internationally been praised for their constructive e$ orts for a lasting solution 
for the island. Russia has become an important economic partner. In October 2005, 
accession negotiations with the EU eventually kicked o$ . Turkey recently mediated 
between Syria and Israel, and between Iran and the West. It is rapidly expanding its 
[1] Editorial, Turkey: a Vital Player, The Guardian (online), 28 July 2010. 
[2] ARAL, B., Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during the Özal Decade, 1983-93, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2001. 
[3] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=fm-vows-a-stronger-turkey-in-2010-2009-12-31.
[4] DAVUTOĞLU, A., Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy (online), 20 May 2010.
130
Turkey’s pro! le in the G20: emerging economy, middle power and bridge-builder
diplomatic contacts, economic activities, and even its soft power in the Arab world, 
Africa, and Latin America. Ankara has also intensi# ed its visibility and engagement 
in various multilateral fora, as will be discussed below.[1] Turkey apparently does 
not have only a few, but dozens of international top priorities on its plate. 
Although Turkish o&  cials are working on several fronts in a professional and dis-
crete way, from time to time the style of Turkish leaders, especially Prime Minister 
Erdoğan, can sometimes be labeled “heroic”, to use Cooper’s terminology. Examples 
are the row before world media between Erdoğan and the Israeli President Shimon 
Peres in Davos in January 2009; the controversial Brazilian-Turkish mediating 
initiative on Iran’s nuclear program; Erdoğan’s support to the Gaza Flotilla; and 
his recent criticism on oil-rich Muslim countries for not sending enough aid to 
Pakistan after the % ood.[2] 
! e bulk of Turkey’s e$ orts has a regional focus. However, what is pretty interesting 
about the Turkish case, is that the country is part of various regional systems at the 
same time: Europe, NATO, OECD, Black Sea, Mediterranean, Balkans, Middle 
East, Caucasus, the Turkic[3] and the Muslim world. Ankara is investing diplomatic 
capital in most of these regions. But at the same time, Turkey is reaching out globally 
as well. It has opened several new embassies in Africa and Latin America. ! ese 
o&  cial e$ orts are mutually reinforced by frantic transnational activity by employ-
ers’ federations and civil society organizations all over the world. Turkey further 
develops its visibility in multilateral forums as well, of which its G20 membership 
since 1999 is just one element. It holds a non-permanent seat in the UN Security 
Council for 2009-2010; this is for the # rst time since 1961. Over the last years the 
country has been contributing in a substantial way to several peace-keeping mis-
sions with troops and police o&  cers under various multilateral arrangements (UN, 
NATO, OSCE, EU), in places such as former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Darfur, and 
Afghanistan.[4] Turkey is one of the four countries that bene# ted from the 2006 ad 
hoc quota increase in the IMF to give important emerging powers a greater say and 
responsibility.[5] Another quota reform from which Turkey will probably bene# t, is 
underway. Since 2005, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), is led 
[1] AKTAY, Y., Politics at Home, Politics in the World. The Return of the Political in Turkish Foreign Policy, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2010; LARRABEE, S.F., Turkey’s New Geopolitcs, Survival, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2010.
[2] http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-221089-erdogan-criticizes-muslim-countries-for-reluctance-to-help-
pakistan.html.
[3] Those nations sharing a common history and cultural heritage, including a language closely related to Turkish (such 
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by a Turkish Secretary-General, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu.[1] Also in 2005, together 
with Spain, Turkey launched the “Alliance of Civilizations”, a new international 
body under the umbrella of the UN.[2] In the near past, Turkey hosted the NATO 
summit (2004), the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank (2009) and the 
3rd summit of the Conference on Interaction and Con# dence Building Measures 
in Asia (CICA) (2010) (all in Istanbul), besides a list of other high-level multilat-
eral events. In 2011, it will host the 4th United Nations Conference on the Least 
Developed Countries. In the coming few years, it is also candidate to host a G20 
summit as chair (see below).
Finally, to stay within Cooper’s typology, Turkey acts both “accommodative” 
and “combative” vis-à-vis the established, still Western-dominated world order. It 
remains a loyal NATO and OECD member, as well as EU candidate. Claims that 
Turkey is turning its back to the West are not empirically grounded. ! is point was 
recently acknowledged by Steven Vanackere, Belgian Minister of Foreign A$ airs, 
a Christian-democrat and currently chair of the EU’s General and External A$ airs 
Council: “[Turkey is] looking around 360 degrees, it does exactly what is normal. 
Every country should do exactly that. And it is clear that having relationships with 
all countries, also the countries from outside the European Union, is a way for 
Turkey to make itself even more interesting as a partner, as a strategic partner for 
the European Union.”[3] 
Nevertheless, as some other middle powers do, Turkey is going its own way, and 
is not longer obedient to one particular superpower. In 2003, the Turkish parlia-
ment refused to host US troops for the invasion of Iraq. Its improved relations 
with Syria and Iran, its badly deteriorating relations with Israel in 2009-2010, and 
the controversial Turkish-Brazilian mediating e$ ort on Iran in 2010, were other 
matters of concern for Washington. Turkey is simultaneously working on energy 
and pipeline projects with Russia and the West. ! at a country can de# ne its own 
foreign policy is a sign of a de-polarization and democratization of international 
politics. Turkey’s leadership should be careful, though, not to give the impression 
to be all too uncritical about leaders with an awful human rights record such as 
Iran’s Ahmadinejad and Sudan’s al-Bashir, and so undermine the soft power that 
has been built up. ! is does not preclude, however, that there might be good 
reasons why Turkey maintains more constructive relations than others with an 
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the international community in terms of mediating potential. ! e challenge is to 
strike the right balance. 
! e upgrade of the G20 to a leaders’ summit adds an interesting dimension to 
Turkey’s middle-powermanship. It is a valuable opportunity to consolidate its 
position along the above-mentioned lines, and in particular, to enhance Turkey’s 
global and multilateral outreach. As we will show, it seems that Turkey’s leadership 
and sherpa team are grasping it. 
2. TURKEY’S FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRIORITIES: SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ENGAGEMENT
2.1. Prepared for a Global Financial Crisis
Turkey has drawn many lessons from the severe # nancial crisis it experienced in 
2000-2001. In the months and years after that crisis, its entire macro-economic and 
# nancial-regulatory policy went through a revolution. In% ation and public debt 
were brought under control. ! e banking sector was completely overhauled. ! e 
weak parts of it were eliminated. Financial regulation in Turkey was elevated to an 
international state-of-the-art level. ! e government achieved major improvements 
with regard to capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, enhancement of deposit-based 
funding, the political autonomy and professionalization of the Banking Regulation 
and Supervision Agency, stricter licensing for new # nancial institutions, resolution 
procedures for failed banks, etc.[1] “Governments of advanced economies are now 
considering the kind of # nancial regulation Turkey already implemented over the 
last decade”, a Turkish top o&  cial in # nancial and economic policy-making now 
says.[2] 
Turkey has been hit hard by the 2008-2009 global # nancial crisis. Its GDP decreased 
by 4,7% in 2009. According to harmonized OECD data, the unemployment rate 
rose from 8,8 to 12,5% in 2009, although the latest data show a marked improve-
ment (11,4 in the # rst quarter of 2010; 10,5 % in the second quarter).[3] During 
the crisis, Turkey did neither need to bailout banks, nor ask the IMF for help. 
Now, the country is quickly recovering from the crisis. In the second quarter of 
2010, GDP increased by 10,3% compared to the same quarter of 2009. Both the 
[1] See, e.g., Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, From Crisis to Financial Stability (Turkey Experience). Working 
Paper (revised Second Edition), 29 December 2009; IMF, Turkey. Sta!  Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation and Post-
Program Monitoring. 13 July 2010. 
[2] Interview with G20-related Turkish top o#  cial in August 2010. 
[3] http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/46/46001339.pdf; http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=6320
133
Dries LESAGE and Yusuf KAÇAR
government and independent analysts expect growth of about 6% over 2010 as 
a whole.[1] To compare, for the Euro-zone, the European Central Bank expects a 
growth rate of 1,6%. ! anks to improved economic indicators, in March 2010 Tur-
key ended talks with the IMF on a new loan agreement.[2] ! e IMF acknowledges 
Turkey’s “e$ ective domestic policy response.”[3] According to a recent statement 
of the OECD, “Turkey’s economic growth is likely to be among the strongest of 
OECD countries in 2010, supported by # nancial stability, international investor 
con# dence and a dynamic business sector.”[4] However the IMF, the OECD and a 
number of # nancial analysts are concerned about the political postponement of a 
promised, new “# scal rule” on budgetary discipline, especially now when Turkey 
has decided to go on without IMF help. In the lead-up to the 2011 parliamentary 
elections and 2012 # rst-ever direct presidential election, such a rule would foster 
investors’ con# dence, it is said.[5] Anyhow, the current state of a$ airs gives Turkey 
a more self-con# dent position at the G20 table, and indeed, the public # nances 
and banking sectors of several old industrialized countries are in much bigger 
trouble nowadays. 
2.2. Turkey’s Priorities: Linked to Emerging Market Identity
In the run-up to the Seoul summit, when asked about Ankara’s priorities, Turkish 
o&  cials stress that they follow all G20 topics with great interest and actively participate 
in discussions on a wide range of issues. Yet, the three issues discussed below receive 
special attention.[6] ! ey re% ect to some extent Turkey’s identity as an emerging mar-
ket. Yet, Turkish o&  cials believe that there is no particular split between emerging and 
advanced economies in the G20. ! ey warn that this sort of caucuses would be very 
harmful to the G20 process; this also means implicitly that they are not enthusiastic 
either to see the G7 prepare G20 meetings for themselves. On certain issues, Turkey’s 
position is closer to the average of the G7 countries, on others closer to the emerging 
economies. In fact, Turkish o&  cials see a speci# c and constructive role for Turkey 
within the G20, being both a OECD member and emerging market.
[1] Turkish Statistical Institute, Prime Ministry, Republic of Turkey, Press Release No. 157, 14 September 2010; STRAUSS, 
D., Turkish GDP grows 3.7% in second quarter, Financial Times (online), 14 September 2010.
[2] STRAUSS, D., Turkey’s IMF ! nancing talks end, Financial Times (online), 10 March 2010. 
[3] IMF, op. cit., 2010. 
[4] http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
[5] http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,3343,en_2649_34569_46011535_1_1_1_37443,00.html; STRAUSS, D., OECD 
urges Turkey to implement ! scal reform, Financial Times (online), 15 September 2010; Lex, The Turkish economy, Financial 
Times (online), 15 August 2010; IMF, 2010.
[6] The information in this section is largely based on anonymous interviews in Ankara with 3 high-ranking o#  cials at 
the Treasury and Ministry of Finance in charge of G20 matters end of July, beginning of August 2010. 
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A top priority for Turkey is reform of the Bretton Woods institutions, and accord-
ing to some, it is the # rst. With regard to the IMF, Ankara is mostly interested 
in quota reform and a doubling of the IMF’s total quota in order to enhance the 
institution’s capacity. Turkey urges that the Pittsburgh agreement — “a shift in 
[…] quota share to dynamic emerging markets and developing countries of at least 
5% from over-represented countries to under-represented countries” — is rapidly 
implemented. ! ere should be an agreement by the Seoul summit. Reform of 
the Executive Board, where Europe is said to be overrepresented, is a priority of 
secondary order. As this issue is closely related with the quota redistribution, the 
composition of the Executive Board should be rede# ned after the adoption of a 
new quota structure, o&  cials in Ankara say. ! is prudence might be explained by 
the fact that Turkey, as an EU candidate, is in an awkward position to openly sup-
port a major reshu)  e at the expense of a number EU countries. Observers expect, 
however, that Turkey could bene# t in a considerable way under certain schemes 
of quota and Executive Board reform.  
Turkey also believes that the next IMF managing director should not necessar-
ily be a European; IMF and World Bank top management should be open to all 
nationalities. With regard to IMF instruments, Turkey is quite happy about the 
“Flexible Credit Line”, a new instrument based on ex ante conditionality for very 
well-performing countries aimed at both crisis prevention and resolution. But here 
Turkey is on the side of those countries advocating more % exibility and “more open, 
transparent and objective eligibility criteria”. 
A second priority is the Korean proposal of a “global # nancial safety net.” O&  cials 
in Ankara stress they are strongly supporting the 2010 G20 chair on this matter. 
In 2008, despite its sound economic fundamentals, the Republic of Korea had to 
request monetary assistance from the US, Japan and China to avoid a # nancial 
disaster. Partly based on this experience, Seoul strongly advocates a stronger mul-
tilateral # nancial safety net, including much larger preventive support facilities 
for economies with sound economic credentials. ! is, proponents believe, would 
also reduce the necessity to hold abundant monetary reserves. In this framework, 
the IMF should be strengthened — this is also a demand from the US — but at 
the same time regional and bilateral arrangements should be expanded as well.[1] 
Emerging economies like Korea and Turkey are also sensitive to the idea that 
IMF conditionality should not be too intrusive, and there should be more place 
for national ownership in crisis response. Turkey’s sound economic fundamen-
[1] G20 Seoul Summit, http://www.seoulsummit.kr/eng/goPage.g20?return_url=TOP01_SUB03_02; OLIVER, C., South 
Korea pushes for global swaps regime, Financial Times (online), 1 March 2010; VENKAT, P.R. and KANGA Kong, IMF Working 
with Asia on Global Financial Safety Net, Wall Street Journal (online), 13 July 2010. 
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tals today indicate that this position stems from a genuine concern about a more 
reasonable balance between the IMF and the legitimate views and objectives of 
the countries in need, and not from a principled stance against conditionality and 
accountability. ! e IMF’s FLC and the new Precautionary Credit Line (PLC) — 
for countries with weaker fundamentals and with a moderate form of ex ante and 
ex post conditionality — are seen as new instruments that form part of the G20’s 
Korea-initiated “global # nancial safety net” initiative. 
! ird, Turkey is very concerned about the in% uence of credit rating agencies in 
global # nancial markets, and is therefore fervently in favor of new regulation. 
Emerging economies are wary to see Western, private agencies assess their banks 
and treasuries with sometimes serious consequences. Turkey is an active stakeholder 
in the debate on “methodology, transparency, and accountability”. 
With regard to the G20 discussion on bank tax and # nancial transaction tax (FTT), 
Turkey is clearly on the side of the skeptics. It did not have to undertake a bank 
bailout and it already has a deposit insurance system (TMSF[1]) in place, mainly 
funded by premiums banks have to pay over their deposits. A globally coordinated 
FTT aimed at # nancing for development would come on top of this kind of levies, 
which are already applied in several countries. “! is would only increase the cost 
of # nance”, a Turkish o&  cial states. In Ankara’s # nancial and economic decision-
making circles, there is clearly no appetite for new G20-agreed taxes. Having said 
that, Turkey does not oppose any taxes other countries want to introduce in this 
context. 
Nevertheless, Turkey — along with Germany and France — is strongly in favor 
of the G20/OECD agenda against tax evasion and tax havens, which is about a 
better enforcement of the existing, regular taxation. ! is policy basically consists 
of expanding worldwide the OECD standard of information exchange prevailing 
over national banking secrecy rules. Relevant Turkish o&  cials support this policy 
without any reservation.[2] Finally, given the strength of the Turkish # nancial sector, 
there are no special concerns about the G20 regulatory agenda. 
[1] Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, http://www.tmsf.org.tr/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.dsp_menu_
content&menu_id=12&lang=en_EN. 
[2] Interviews with high-ranking o#  cials at the Turkish Ministry of Finance in July 2010.
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3. ANKARA’S POLITICAL AGENDA FOR THE G20
3.1. Broadening the G20 Agenda
! e Turkish government’s position on the future role of the G20 is quite unam-
biguous.[1] It is strongly in favor of a gradual broadening of the G20 summit agenda, 
to include less classical economic matters as well. Nevertheless, Turkish o&  cials 
understand that at the outset, the majority of the more “political” issues that are 
now addressed in the G20 — development, poverty eradication, food security, 
climate # nance, marine environment protection, energy security — are still in a 
way connected with the G20 core # nancial and economic agenda in response to 
the crisis. So, the agenda can widen in an organic way, and should not be pushed 
through precipitately. 
Anyway, agenda broadening is now well underway. As far as the “traditional” 
# nancial and economic agenda is concerned, the Turkish government appreciates 
that the G20 summit is now moving to a longer-term agenda than the direct crisis 
response. ! is opens perspectives for a relevant and cumulative agenda for the 
annual summits from 2011 onwards. Interestingly, Turkish G20-related policy 
circles see wide support for agenda broadening within the G20. ! e less economic 
items that are already on the table, have met almost no resistance. ! is also holds 
for “development” as the thematic priority of the upcoming Seoul summit. In 
Ankara, it is also perceived that the global public opinion expects this from a body 
such as the G20. Given what the G20 represents in terms of demography, world 
output and trade, the group may claim representativeness and legitimacy. In this 
context, Turkey is also in favor of more ministerial meetings (other than # nance) 
before a summit. ! e labor ministerial in Washington ahead of the June 2010 
Toronto summit was a # rst step. 
Although Turkey’s sherpa team stresses that it deems all political G20 topics very 
timely and relevant, and contributes to a broad range of items, it mentions develop-
ment as the number one for this moment. It stands very sympathetic towards the 
development agenda Korea as chair wants to highlight in Seoul. ! is is seen as part 
of “Turkey’s responsibility with regard to global issues.” Interestingly, Turkey as  
a relatively poorer country within the OECD is not (yet) a major donor. It is not a 
member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Yet, Ankara 
wants to contribute with its expertise as a successful emerging economy — a similar 
[1] This section is largely based on an interview with Ambassador Hakkı AKIL, G20 Sherpa, in July 2010. 
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echo can be heard from Korea. Possibly, these emerging economies would like to 
stress other aspects of development strategy than o&  cial development assistance 
as well. 
Intensifying relations with the developing world is also a key dimension of Turkey’s 
renewed foreign policy. Over the last few years, Turkey has opened 15 new embas-
sies in Africa and 2 in Latin America.[1] It was elected as non-permanent member 
of the UN Security Council thanks to numerous votes from least developed coun-
tries. From 30 May to 3 June 2011, Turkey will host the Fourth United Nations 
Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul.
A second priority is energy. A G20 energy working-group is now studying fossil 
fuel energy price volatility, fossil fuels subsidies, and global marine environment 
protection in relation to oil extraction and transportation. It was the BP catastrophe 
that enticed G20 interest in this topic. In Toronto, G20 leaders stated: “Follow-
ing the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico we recognize the need to share best 
practices to protect the marine environment, prevent accidents related to o$ shore 
exploration and development, as well as transportation, and deal with their conse-
quences”. Turkey has warmly welcomed this move, as safety of oil transportation 
is a huge concern for Turkey and the 15 million inhabitants of Istanbul. Every 
day, 1.85 million barrels of crude oil pass through the Bosporus and Dardanelles 
sea straits. Since 1995, tra&  c has more than doubled, and is likely to double again 
in the next decade because of increased oil production and new projects in Russia, 
the Black Sea and Caspian regions. Turkey is fervently seeking to cut tanker tra&  c 
through its straits, and has used the BP oil spill to intensify its e$ orts. One part of 
the solution is the planned overland Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline from the Black Sea 
to the Mediterranean. ! ese plans also include an upgrade of the port of Ceyhan as 
a very important energy hub. ! e G20 partners Russia and Italy are closely involved 
with this project. Willingness on the part of Russian oil companies such as Rosneft 
and Transneft to ship enough oil through the pipeline to render it pro# table — 
which is still more expensive than by sea —, combined with political backing from 
Moscow, is key. Another part of the solution is the possible introduction of more 
cumbersome regulation (e.g., relating to tanker size) and higher insurance fees for 
tankers. In this context, Turkey will have to strike a delicate balance between its 
international obligations concerning free commercial transit through the straits and 
its legitimate environmental concerns. Besides oil transit, Turkey is increasingly 
concerned about the environmental risks connected with oil drilling in the Black 
[1] DAVUTOĞLU, A., Turkey’s Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy (online), 20 May 2010.
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sea. Most probably, in addition to contributing to the general discussion, Ankara 
will try to garner support in the G20 for its proposals.[1]
3.2. Chair and Secretariat 
Ankara is de# nitely prepared to invest in the G20. It has already signaled that it is 
candidate to chair and host a summit in the coming years. A possibility is 2013, 
when the regional grouping Turkey belongs to, will have to deliver the chair. At 
the same time, at G20 meetings, Turkey has already spoken out in favor of the 
establishment of a permanent secretariat for the G20. A technical G20 working 
group is already considering the idea, even though several G20 members # nd the 
idea still premature.[2] ! e rationale to create a secretariat is to assist chairs in coor-
dinating the G20 process and organize a summit, which is all the more interesting 
for smaller G20 countries. With the expansion of the agenda and commitments, it 
becomes very year a bigger challenge for the chair and the troika to keep oversight. 
Moreover, the secretariat would function as the o&  cial memory of the organization. 
Turkey has already suggested that Istanbul might be an appropriate location.[3] 
Within the G20 context, Turkey is indeed centrally located geographically, while 
politically it has the advantage of being an intercultural bridge-builder and inde-
pendent middle power maintaining good relations with a broad range of players. 
As mentioned above, Istanbul already hosted several high-pro# le international 
meetings, including the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank. ! e gov-
ernment is currently working to move the Turkish central bank physically from 
Ankara to Istanbul. ! is is part of the idea to develop Istanbul, according to Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, into a global # nancial centre — “comparable to New York and 
London”. He also refers to the role the city of Istanbul played during the history 
of the Ottoman Empire as a stopping place on commercial routes and a # nancial 
and economic hub.[4] 
[1] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-to-act-against-bosphorus-timebomb-2010-06-18; O’BYRNE, D., 
Energy: Success of oil pipeline depends on whims of Moscow, Financial Times (online), 25 November 2009; http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-01/turkey-says-oil-companies-support-cuts-to-bosporus-straits-tanker-tra#  c.html.
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4. CONCLUSION: A COMMITTED GLOBAL PLAYER AND G20 MEMBER
Aysan notes that the G20 is not yet a matter of much debate in Turkey. It is still 
mainly considered as a technocratic forum. However, the government is portray-
ing Turkey’s membership of the enhanced G20 as another indication of Turkey’s 
rising status.[1] In fact, by aiming for a more prominent G20 role in global govern-
ance, Turkey is increasing its own prestige and in% uence too; in this respect, the 
interests of the G20 and Turkey are intertwined. In the meantime, Turkey is also 
making contributions to the development of a “G20 identity” within the group. 
In certain capitals, such as Brussels, the Turkish mission has already convened 
meetings of the G20 ambassadors. Started as an initiative of the previous Turkish 
ambassador in Australia, the Foreign Ministry in Ankara now encourages all its 
missions to undertake similar initiatives. ! is way, diplomats at several places and 
levels are made familiar with the G20 process, so that it takes root in much wider 
circles than the sherpa teams and the directly involved diplomats and technocrats. 
Turkey’s current involvement in the G20 is very much in line with what we can 
expect from contemporary middle powers. Middle powers usually want to play a 
substantial role regionally and globally. Strengthening the multilateral arrangements 
in which they have a potentially in% uential role is their key strategy to counterbal-
ance the great powers, to promote a rules-based international order, and to preserve 
their say in world a$ airs. ! ey are also realistic enough to fully appreciate the sig-
ni# cant progress the upgrade of the G20 means for global governance, even though 
the G20 is a selective club, and the idea of an equally e$ ective United Nations 
normatively superior — but also utopian. ! anks to their relative independence 
(especially in the post-Cold War context), their preference for multilateralism, and 
the idealism they often display, the middle powers’ actions can bene# t the broader 
international community as well, including the smaller states. A precondition is the 
presence of visionary leaders and a well-resourced, skillful diplomacy willing to play 
such a committed role. Over the last decades, Turkey has proved to possess these 
assets, which appear to be present among various political parties and philosophi-
cal currents within the country. Non-G8 middle powers such as Turkey are the 
main drivers of an interesting future role for the G20, since the great powers have 
fewer incentives to enhance the G20’s status and expand its agenda, and some G8 
middle powers might be wary of seeing their in% uence “watered down” in a much 
wider forum than the G8. 
[1] AYSAN, A.F., Country Fact sheet — Turkey, in POHLMANN, C., et al., The G-20: A “Global Economic Government” in the 
Making? (Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).
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In the meantime, notwithstanding their tough internal debates and political polari-
zation, the Turks are modernizing their democracy, with greater civil liberties, rights 
for minorities, and a vibrant civil society, in a context of economic prosperity and 
# nancial stability. Yet, as is the case with most countries in the world, the transition 
from the 20th to the 21st century has not been # nished yet. Hopefully, more unity, 
inclusiveness, and mature pluralism will come out of the rapid changes the country 
is going through. At the same time, sensible public diplomacy is required to foster 
correct foreign perceptions about Turkey’s complex reality. Anyway, whether they 
voted yes or no in the constitutional referendum of 12 September 2010 (which also 
among fervent democrats enticed a lot of debate), an overwhelming majority of 
Turkish citizens are thinking in the same general direction. Self-con# dence, built 
on an impressive past, is rapidly growing. Major progress is being made in several 
societal spheres at the same time: economy, science, infrastructure, earthquake 
safety, public transportation, environmental protection, good governance, cultural 
outreach, etc. ! e potential of what Turkey can contribute to the world — be it with 
regard to mediating and peace-building, development in Africa and Asia, reducing 
Huntingtonian tensions, or regional environmental protection — is indeed huge. 
! e G20 provides a strategic platform for this — and Ankara is at the forefront 
of giving this forum an even more prominent place in global governance. Turkey 
today is quite di$ erent from the Turkey that knocked on the EU’s door back in 
the 1980s, and di$ erent from the Turkey that became a G20 member and o&  cial 
EU candidate in 1999. What now a lot of Europeans do not seem to realize, is 
that it is rather the EU who risks to miss a big opportunity here — except from 
people like British Prime Minister David Cameron, who recently called Turkey 
“Europe’s BRIC.”[1] ! is story is another example of the way the old world order 
is challenged, with new voices, inspirations and capabilities, and how our planet 
may be turned into a more democratic place.
[1] http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/07/pms-speech-in-turkey-53869. 
